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Fixing Enforcement and Due Process
Will Not Fix What Is Wrong with the
NCAA
Donna A. Lopiano, Ph.D.*

When I was asked to contribute an article to the Roger
Williams University Law Review Symposium Edition on fixing the
due process and enforcement rules and regulations of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), I immediately
responded with a counterproposal. I requested permission to
explore why so much more than investigatory, adjudication, and
enforcement processes need to be fixed; why the NCAA has been
incapable of significant reform; and the conditions under which
truly educational reform might occur. Enforcement and due
process are important, but constitute such a small part of what is
wrong with the NCAA, including: weak eligibility regulations that
permit exploitation of academically underprepared athletes
(especially those who are admitted without meeting normal
admissions standards), lack of tenured faculty oversight of athlete
academic practices (enrollment in easy majors and classes and
suspect tutor support administered by the athletic department),
lack of whistle-blower protection to protect athletes or faculty who
report rules violations or mistreatment, disproportionate salaries
for coaches and athletic directors, expensive and excessively lavish
facilities available only to athletes, high student fees used to
*

President and founder of Sports Management Resources, a consulting firm;
adjunct instructor of Sports Management at Southern Connecticut State
University. Lopiano earned her master’s and doctoral degrees from the
University of Southern California and her bachelor’s degree from Southern
Connecticut State University.
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support athletics, athletes putting in more hours at practice and
competing than studying to pass their courses, and more.
My premises are simple: (1) the members of the NCAA have
lost control of the commercialism of Division I (“D-I”) athletics due
to changes it allowed in the NCAA governance structure that gave
legislative control to the institutions with the most
commercialized athletic programs; (2) the blame for increasingly
unregulated and commercialized Division I athletics is a direct
result of a small number of the most powerful and successful
athletic programs bullying a much larger NCAA membership to
succumb to their legislative wishes by threatening to leave the
organization, thereby removing the NCAA’s primary funding
source; and (3) given the current Division I Football Bowl
Subdivision controlled structure of the NCAA, only action by
Congress using the penalties of higher education institutions’ loss
of federal Higher Education Act funding or tax preferences and
the incentive of a limited antitrust exemption can produce
sustainable reform.
I.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE NCAA MEMBERSHIP

In order to fully comprehend how a small minority of highly
commercialized athletic programs are being allowed to engage in
highly questionable activities, it is important to first understand
the composition of the NCAA membership and the huge financial
differences among members of various competitive divisions, as
well as to dispel the myth of self-supporting athletic programs.
The NCAA is a not-for-profit organization governed by its member
institutions and conferences.1 In 2012–13, there were 1,076 fouryear institutions that were active voting members and an
additional 26 members categorized as provisional or candidate
non-voting members.2 Ninety-seven of 141 conference members
had voting rights, and there were 37 affiliated non-member

1. See Frequently-Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa (last visited Jan.
3, 2015).
2. Composition and Sports Sponsorship of the Membership: 2012–2013
Composition, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/
composition-and-sport-sponsorship-membership (last visited Jan. 3, 2015)
[hereinafter Composition of Membership].
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organizations.3 Of the 1,076 active member institutions, 346 were
members of Division I, the highest competitive division; 291 were
members of Division II (“D-II”), which is mandated to offer fewer
scholarships and impose other athletic program operations
restrictions compared to Division I; and 439 were members of
Division III (“D-III”), the non-scholarship division.4
The
philosophy of Division I is openly “commercial,” in that these
institutions seek to maximize athletic program generated
revenues in order to have their athletic programs pay for
themselves.5 In addition to serving the student-athlete, Division I
programs seek to provide a larger institutional audience (faculty,
staff, student), as well as the general public,6 with an
entertainment product that enhances the affinity of these
audiences with the educational institution.
Only 100 Division I members do not sponsor football (e.g.,
Marquette, St. John’s, DePaul, and Georgetown).7 The remaining
246 Division I members are divided into two subdivisions for the
sport of football, the Football Championship Subdivision (“FCS”)
(e.g., Grambling State, Missouri State, Illinois State, Cornell, and
University of Delaware) with 126 members and the Football Bowl
Subdivision (“FBS”) (e.g., University of Texas, Ohio State
University, University of Alabama, and University of Southern
California) with 120 members.8 FBS institutions sponsor higher-

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Gary T. Brown, Division I self-sufficiency expected—but most
often not realized, NCAA NEWS (Aug. 29, 2005, 1:24 PM), http://
fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2005/Division+I/division%2Bi%2Bself-su
fficiency%2Bexpected%2B-%2Bbut%2Bmost%2Boften%2Bnot%2Brealized%2
B-%2B8-29-05%2Bncaa%2Bnews.html.
6.
See NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 20.9.2(c)), at 347
(2014), [hereinafter D-1 MANUAL] available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/productdownloads/ D115.pdf.
7. Composition of Membership, supra note 2.
8. Id. From the inception of the NCAA in 1906 through 1955, there
were no separate membership divisions representing different levels of
competition. See Brian D. Shannon & Jo Potuto, Presentation at the Division
I-A Faculty Representative Annual Meeting on NCAA Governance: Now & In
the Future 8 (Sep. 22, 2013), available at http://www.cbssports.com/
images/collegefootball/NCAA-Governance-FAR.pdf. From 1956 to 1972, there
were two divisions: college (smaller schools) and university. Id. In 1973, the
NCAA adopted the current three-division structure and, in 1978, split
Division I into the current FBS, FCS, and non-football subdivisions. Id.
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budget athletic programs and are committed to competing in
basketball and football “at the highest feasible level of
intercollegiate competition.”9 All FBS members sponsor spectatororiented, revenue-producing basketball programs, and 246
sponsor
spectator-oriented,
revenue-producing
football
10
programs.
FBS athletic programs must also meet minimum
requirements in four areas: (1) sports sponsorship (must sponsor
at least 16 NCAA championship sports including football, with
each sport also meeting participant and regular season contest
criteria minimums in order to count against the sponsorship
standard); (2) scheduling (must play at least 60% of their football
schedules, at least 5 home contests against other FBS members,
all but four men’s and women’s basketball games against Division
I opponents, and 50% of contests in other sports against Division I
opponents); (3) attendance at football games (must average 15,000
people in actual or paid attendance per home game over a rolling
two-year period); and (4) scholarship allocations (must award 90%
of the maximum number of football scholarships allowed and 200
grant-in-aids, or $4 million in total scholarship expenditures).11
Total operating expenses at FBS institutions range from $11.4 to
$146.8 million.12
Notably, in 2013, only 20 Division I programs—all FBS
institutions, but representing only 1.9% of all NCAA active
members and 16% of FBS—actually produced more revenues than
they spent.13 Operating losses of the remaining institutions

9. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 20.9.2(e), at 347.
10.
Composition of Membership, supra note 2. See also D-1 MANUAL,
supra note 6, art. 20.9.2(e), at 347 (“A member of Division I . . . [s]ponsors at
the highest feasible level of intercollegiate competition one or both of the
traditional spectator-oriented, income-producing sports of football and
basketball.” (emphasis added)).
11.
D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 20.9.9, at 353–54.
12.
NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS
REPORT: 2004 – 2013 REVENUES & EXPENSES 45 (compiled by Daniel L. Fulks,
2014) [hereinafter D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT] (contains data for
fiscal years 2004–2013), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D1REVEXP2013.pdf.
13.
Id. at 8.
Revenues for this calculation exclude institutional
subsidies (such as transfers from the institution’s general fund and mandated
student fees allocated to support athletics), capital costs, and debt service
expenditures.
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ranged from a high of $49 million to a low of $256,00014 with a
median of $11.6 million, representing a 2% increase over the
previous year.15 The overt expression of a commercial and
entertainment sport philosophy—commemorated in the NCAA
rules manual—and the practice of excessive spending has fueled
an FBS arms race and a system of student-athlete exploitation,
which serves as the primary focus of this Article.
NCAA FCS teams have somewhat lower competitive
subdivision criteria than the FBS and lack a football game
attendance requirement. FCS institution athletic programs must
meet minimum requirements in the areas of: (1) sports
sponsorship (must sponsor at least 14 NCAA championship sports
including football, with each sport also meeting participant and
regular season contest criteria minimums in order to count
against the sponsorship standard); (2) scheduling (must play at
least 50% of regular season football contests against FBS or FCS
members, all but four men’s and women’s basketball games
against Division I opponents, and 50% of contests in other sports
against Division I opponents); and (3) scholarship allocations
(lower number of scholarships allowed in football).16 The athletic
program annual budgets for these institutions range from $4.4 to
$42.2 million.17 The financial status of these institutions is
significantly more precarious than FBS institutions.
No
institution generates more revenues than it spends.18 They are
heavily subsidized by institutional allocations (71% of total
operating budgets).19 Median operating losses of $10.8 million
represent an 83% increase since 2004,20 with losses ranging from
a high of $32.8 million to a low of $2.8 million.21
The 100 non-football playing Division I institutions must
meet minimum requirements in three areas as well: (1) sports
sponsorship (must sponsor at least 14 NCAA championship sports
including football, with each sport also meeting participant and
14.
Id. at 47.
15.
Id. at 12.
16. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, arts. 15.5.6.2, 20.9.7.1, 20.9.8.1, 20.9.10,
at 202, 352, 355.
17. D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT, supra note 12, at 70.
18. Id. at 14.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 72.
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regular season contest criteria minimums in order to count
against the sponsorship standard); (2) scheduling (must play all
but four basketball contests against other Division I opponents
and at least 50% of their schedules in other sports against
Division I opponents); and (3) scholarship allocations (must award
a minimum of 50% of the maximum allowable grants in 14 sports,
an equivalent number of full scholarships, or an equivalent
amount in aggregated total scholarship expenditures).22 Total
operating budgets of these schools range from $3.7 to $35.8
million.23
The financial status of these institutions is as precarious as
FCS institutions, if not more so, despite having significantly
smaller operating budgets. Like FCS institutions, none of these
institutions operate at a profit either.24
They are heavily
subsidized by institutional allocations (77% of total operating
budgets).25 Median operating losses in 2013 were $10.7 million,
ranging from a high of $31.2 million to a low of $2.8 million.26
Key to understanding the financial relationships between the
three Division I subdivisions is that they are all engaged in
recruiting the same elite level athletes, except that the FCS has
accepted its second class position in football. Thus, the so called
“arms race” affects all member institutions. If lavish locker
rooms, computer centers exclusively for athletes, and other special
benefits are provided by FBS institutions, the rest of the
subdivisions are then pressured to match these investments.
Particularly important to all Division I members is access to the
68 team, Division I national men’s basketball championship,
commonly referred to as “March Madness” or the “Final Four.”
The one-loss-and-out nature of this championship makes
“Cinderella” teams possible, and as detailed later, the significant
largess of the media rights associated with the tournament gets
returned to all Division I member institutions. Even within the
FBS, there is segmentation between the 65 institutions
comprising the so-called “Big Five” conferences,27 which consist of
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, arts. 20.9.3, .6–8, at 348–49, 352.
D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT, supra note 12, at 95.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 96.
The “Big Five” conferences include the Atlantic Coast Conference
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the richest athletic programs, as well as the other 60 institutions
in the FBS. Thus, recruiting, financial aid, and other rules that
result in differing treatment of athletes within the subdivisions
affect the financial integrity of the entire Division I system.
In contrast to the Division I philosophy, Divisions II and III
make no mention of maximizing athletic program revenues.
Division II centers its philosophical statement on the role of
athletics, athlete “growth opportunities through academic
achievement, learning in high-level athletics competition and
development of positive societal attitudes in service to community.
The balance and integration of these different areas of learning
provide Division II student-athletes a path to graduation while
cultivating a variety of skills and knowledge for life ahead.”28
Division II institution athletic programs must meet minimum
requirements in only two areas: (1) sports sponsorship (must
sponsor at least 10 NCAA championship sports with one sport in
each of three sport seasons, with each sport also meeting
participant and regular season contest criteria minimums in order
to count against the sponsorship standard) and (2) scholarship
allocations (have lower limits on the number of scholarships that
can be awarded in each sport and, generally, must award the
equivalent of 50% of these lower maximum limits).29 Total
operating expenses at Division II institutions with football range
from $1.8 to $13.3 million, with fewer than 10% of these programs
spending over $10 million.30 Division II institutions without
(“ACC”), the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”), the Big 12 Conference, the
Big Ten Conference, and the Pacific-12 Conference (“Pac-12”). See Kent
Babb, NCAA board of directors approves autonomy for ‘Big Five’ conference
schools, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
colleges/ncaa-board-of-directors-approves-autonomy-for-big-5-conference-scho
ols/2014/08/07/807882b4-1e58-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html.
28. Division
II
Strategic
Positioning
Platform,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/division-ii-strategic-positioningplatform (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
29. NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL art. 20.10.2, at 305–06
(2014) [hereinafter D-II MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/productdownloads/D215.pdf.
30. NCAA, NCAA DIVISION II INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS
REPORT: 2004–2013 REVENUES & EXPENSES 42 (compiled by Daniel L. Fulks,
2014) (contains data for fiscal years 2004–2013), available at http://www.
ncaapublications.com/p-4345-division-ii-revenues-and-expenses-20042013.asp
x?CategoryID=0&SectionID=0&ManufacturerID=0&DistributorID=0&Genre
ID=0& VectorID=0&.
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football programs have operating budgets ranging from $709,400
to $16.9 million.31 These programs are almost entirely supported
by institutional allocations.32 The median athletic program
generated revenue for institutions with football is $640,00033 and
$336,000 for programs without football.34
Division III athletic programs,
place highest priority on the overall quality of the
educational experience and on the successful completion
of all students’ academic programs.
They seek to
establish and maintain an environment in which a
student-athlete’s athletic activities are conducted as an
integral part of the student-athlete’s educational
experience, and in which coaches play a significant role as
educators.35
The Division’s central qualifying premise is not providing any
“award of financial aid to any student on the basis of athletics
leadership, ability, participation or performance.”36 In addition to
the prohibition of athletic-based financial aid, the only other
membership criteria is sports sponsorship based on the size of the
institution—institutions with enrollments of 1,000 or fewer must
have 10 NCAA championship sports, and institutions with greater
than 1,000 students must have at least 12 NCAA championship
sports.37 Total operating expenses at Division III institutions
with football programs range from $784,800 to $14.1 million, with
fewer than 10% of these programs spending over $7 million.38
31. Id. at 67.
32. Id. at 6. Institutional allocations fund 88% of athletic programs with
football and 93% of those without football. Id.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id. at 12.
35. NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 20.11, at 187 (2014)
[hereinafter D-III MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p4357-2014-2015-ncaa-division-iii-manual-august-version.aspx?CategoryID=0
&SectionID=0&ManufacturerID=0&DistributorID=0&GenreID=0&VectorID
=0&.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 188.
38. NCAA, NCAA DIVISION III INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS
REPORT: 2004 – 2013 REVENUES AND EXPENSES 31 (compiled by Daniel L.
Fulks, 2014) (contains data for fiscal years 2004–2013), available at http://
www.ncaapublications.com/p-4348-division-iii-revenues-and-expenses-2004-2
013.aspx?CategoryID=0&SectionID=0&ManufacturerID=0&DistributorID=0
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Athletic budgets at institutions without football programs range
from $421,600 to $9.2 million, with fewer than 10% of these
programs spending over $4.5 million.39 Like Division II but even
more so, the bulk of these programs are funded through
institutional allocations.40 The NCAA does not gather data on
revenues produced in this division.
II. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DIVISION I SELF-INTEREST

The institutionalization of Division I FBS self-interest, and
now particularly the 65 institutions of the Big Five conferences
which have legislative autonomy, is all about keeping as much
national championship and other non-regular season and nonconference championship revenue as possible for themselves.
Thus, it is important to understand the sources of this national
championship revenue, how it is distributed, and who determines
the distribution. The NCAA makes most of its money by owning
and selling marketing rights to its national championships; most
of the remainder derives from national championship gate
receipts.41 The NCAA currently sponsors 89 championships in 23
sports.42 Some of these post-season tournaments are restricted to
competitive division members and some are “open” to teams from
any member institution.43 The bulk of current NCAA revenues is
derived from the 68-team, single elimination, Division I national
basketball championship, branded as “March Madness,” which
culminates in a four-team championship playoff weekend, the
“Final Four.”44 This property generates approximately $770
million annually in NCAA media rights fees, gate receipts, and

&GenreID=0& VectorID=0&.
39. Id. at 46.
40. Id. at 10.
41. See infra Table 1.
42. See Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances
(last visited Jan. 3, 2015) [hereinafter NCAA Finances].
43. Open championships include women’s bowling, men’s and women’s
fencing, men’s and women’s gymnastics, women’s ice hockey, men’s and
women’s rifle, men’s and women’s skiing, men’s volleyball, and men’s and
women’s water polo. See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 20.8.1, at 346.
44. See Mark Alesia, NCAA Approaching $1 Billion Per Year Amid
Challenges by Players, INDYSTAR (Mar. 27, 2014, 11:06 PM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2014/03/27/ncaa-approaching-billion-peryear-amid-challenges-players/6973767/.
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sponsorships.45 From 2012–13, 84% of the NCAA’s total revenues
of $912 million were derived from March Madness.46
TABLE I. NCAA Revenues for the Year ending August 31, 201347
Championship Television and marketing rights fees
Championships and NIT tournaments gate receipts/
sponsorships
Investment income
Sales and services
Contributions-facilities net
TOTAL

$726,391,860
$110,631,867
$41,398,750
$27,307,562
$7,074,007
$912,804,046

A small percentage of that revenue is used to operate the
NCAA’s national office, including the operation of championship
events.48 But in the end, more than 90 cents of every dollar the
NCAA generates is returned to member institutions either for
specified purposes to support student-athletes or unrestricted in
the case of revenues distributed based on Division I basketball
championship participation.49
TABLE 2. NCAA Expenses for the Year ending August 31, 201350
Revenues
Distribution to Division I members
Division I championships, programs, NIT
tournament
Division II championships, distribution, and
programs
Division III championships and programs
Association wide programs
Management and general
TOTAL

Expenses
$527,432,377
$97,407,498

% of
58%
11%

$35,650,808

4%

$27,531,406
$122,244,138
$41,785,827
$852,052,054*

3%
13%
5%

*$60,751,992 difference from total revenues represents funds
invested/reserves (6% of revenues)
45.
46.

Id.
Id.; see also NCAA AND SUBSIDIARIES, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’
REPORT & CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 4 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA
AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS], available at http://www.ncaa.org/
sites/default/files/NCAA_FS_2012-13_V1%20DOC1006715.pdf.
47. NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4.
48. See infra Table 2.
49. NCAA Finances, supra note 42.
50. NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4.

LOPIANOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2015 11:09 AM

260 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:250

The Division I revenue distribution to member institutions is
for the following specified purposes: basketball fund (39%),
student-athlete athletic grants in aid (26%), special student
assistance
(15%),
sports
sponsorship
(13%),
academic
enhancement (5%), conference grants (2%), and supplemental
support (>1%).51 The basketball fund is a pay-off system to
conferences based on the finish of their teams in the Final Four
over a six-year rolling period.52 The conferences subsequently
determine how to distribute this money among their member
institutions.53 To its credit, the NCAA has significantly reduced
the amount of distribution that is based on winning post-season
basketball games and increased amounts dedicated to reimbursing
institutions for their athletic program expenditures on important
student-athlete benefits, such academic support programs,
scholarships, and sport operating costs.54 However, the $100
million portion based on basketball tournament participation is
still very substantial. The non-basketball fund distributions are
fixed amounts in some cases, such as for academic enhancement
(same amount to each Division I member), and based on program
size in other cases, as is the case for sport sponsorship and
scholarships dedicated distributions.55
The bottom line of this explanation is that the NCAA has
established a revenue distribution system that is dominated by
the philosophy of returning the most money to the members
responsible for earning that money, a for-profit business
mentality, rather than acting as a non-profit association. The
NCAA, a non-profit organization, owns its national
championships. The revenues derived from these championships

51. NCAA, 2013–14 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 3 (2014)
[hereinafter D-1 REVENUE DISTRIBUTION], available at http://www.ncaa.org/
sites/default/files/2013-14%20Revenue%20Distribution%20Plan.pdf.
52. Id. at 7, 8.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Prior to 1991, NCAA Final Four revenues were distributed among
only those teams that participated in the Final Four. See Distributions,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/distributions
(last
visited Jan. 3, 2015). In 1991, broad-based distributions to all Division I
institutions were initiated to help support academic, scholarship, and
operating expenses. Id.
55. D-1 REVENUE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 51, at 10.
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should be used to best advance the mission of the organization,
benefitting all of its members and all student-athletes, not just
the athletes participating in commercialized programs. The
NCAA has not adopted the non-profit philosophical position—for
instance, that all national Association revenues should be used in
a way that contributes to the education, health, and welfare of the
greatest number of student-athletes.
Institutions with
commercialized athletic programs earn significant revenues from
their own regular season contests and shares of conference
championships. National championships revenues should assist
all NCAA member institutions, just as conference championship
revenues are split among all conference members.
Notably, the NCAA does not sponsor a FBS football
championship. The College Football Playoff, a four-team play-off
accepted by the public as the FBS national championship, begins
in the fall of 201456 and is the sequel to the Bowl Championship
Series and its two-team championship, which existed from 1998
through 2013.57 The value of the new four-team College Football
Playoff is approximately $470 million per year, and it is owned
jointly by all FBS conferences plus Notre Dame, rather than the
NCAA.58 These College Football Playoff proceeds are not equally
shared among all FBS members. The 65 Big Five conference
members take home 75% of the proceeds, and the remaining 25%
is distributed to the 60 remaining institutions via other FBS
conferences.59 The NCAA FCS championship is a 16-team
tournament. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that it is only a
matter of time before the College Football Playoff is expanded to
eight teams or more, which would most likely increase its
approximate value to more than $1 billion per year.
The fact that almost half of all NCAA revenues and 75% of all
College Football Playoff revenues go to the Big Five conferences
56. See Chronology, COLL. FOOTBALL PLAYOFF, http://www.collegefootball
playoff.com/chronology (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Chronology].
57. See Richard Billingsley, The road to the BCS has been a long one,
ESPN, http://assets.espn.go.com/ncf/s/historybcs.html (last updated Oct. 22,
2014, 12:45 PM).
58. See George Schroeder, Power Five’s College Football Playoff revenues
will double what BCS paid, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014, 5:57 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/07/16/college-football-playof
f-financial-revenues-money-distribution-bill-hancock/127344897/.
59. See id.
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reveals the source code of highly commercialized and
educationally questionable Division I football and basketball
programs. These conferences have intentionally acted to control
NCAA distributions and keep most of the revenues from the
College Football Playoffs for themselves. The goal of the 65 Big
Five conference institutions is clear; they want to win and will
spend whatever it takes to win, all while maintaining a resource
advantage over 94% of all other NCAA member institutions.
Until 1997, the NCAA generally operated as a oneinstitution/one-vote association.60 Members convened annually in
a deliberative assembly requiring a two-thirds vote to adopt
legislation that was constitutional in importance and voting as a
whole or by Division (generally by majority vote) on legislation of
lesser importance.61 In 1997, Division I moved from a oneinstitution/one-vote assembly to a conference based Legislative
Council, subject to review by a Division I Board of Directors.62
Concomitant with this separation from Division II and III in 1997,
using the threat of FBS institutions leaving the NCAA, FBS
schools were successful in accomplishing three goals key to
perpetuating the competitive dominance of the Big Five
conferences: (1) getting NCAA members to agree to a federated
structure—which gave more autonomy to each division but gave
FBS 50% of all voting positions on the NCAA Executive
Committee (the governance structure that has final authority over
the Association’s budget and the power to call for a two-thirds vote
of the entire membership to overturn the action of any division or
subdivision) and 61% control of the Division I Board of
Directors;63 (2) passage of a legislative provision approved by the
entire NCAA membership that relegated Division II and Division
III’s share of NCAA national championship and organization
revenues to no more than 8 to 11% and gave Division I control of
the remaining lion’s share of the NCAA’s revenue distribution;64
and (3) specifying that if any new NCAA subdivision

60. See Allie Grasgreen, Division I Divisiveness, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb.
16, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/02/16/ncaa-governancebrink-reform.
61. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 4.6.4, at 23.
62. See id. art. 4.6, at 23–24.
63. Id. arts. 4.1–4.2.2, at 20–21.
64. Id. arts. 4.01.2, 4.01.2.2.2.3, at 17.
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championship was initiated (practically meaning an FBS national
championship), all of its revenue belonged to and would be under
the control of that subdivision.65
These actions fully protected the revenues from the then-new
football Bowl Championship Series (the predecessor to the current
College Football Playoff National Championship), a property not
owned by the NCAA that was about to launch.66 Even if the
NCAA started an NCAA FBS national championship in the
future, the FBS institutions would not share these NCAA
revenues with other NCAA members, and the FBS would
determine any such distribution among FBS institutions.67
However, given FBS control of the NCAA’s primary legislative
mechanisms, it is highly unlikely that the FBS would permit the
development of a competing product to its College Football
Playoffs. The institutionalization of this plutocracy—giving voting
control to a minority of the wealthiest athletic programs—is
without precedent in either amateur or professional sports
worldwide.
The financial support of Division II and III legislation
actually reads, “[m]embers are guaranteed revenue through
allocations made to each division from the Association’s general
operating revenue. Division II shall receive at least 4.37 percent
of the Association’s annual general operating revenue. Division
III shall receive at least 3.18 percent of the Association’s annual
general operating revenue.”68
The use of “at least” was
disingenuous. In most years, Division II and III (68% of NCAA
active members) receive 8% to 11% of NCAA distributions.69 In
65. Id. art. 4.01.2.2.1, at 17.
66. See BCS governance, BCS BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES,
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809846 (last updated Mar. 27,
2014, 7:04 PM). Following the adoption of this NCAA legislation in 1997, it
was no accident that in 1998 the FBS conferences created the Bowl
Championship Series (“BCS”) with five bowl games among the top 10 teams.
See Billingsley, supra note 57. In 2006, the FBS conferences added a #1 vs.
#2 national championship game the week after New Year’s, effectively
starting their own national championship. See id. The BCS was the
predecessor to the four-team FBS College Football Playoff, which began in
the fall of 2014. See Chronology, supra note 56.
67. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 4.01.2.2, at 17.
68. Id. art. 4.01.2.1, at 17.
69. NCAA,
MEMBERSHIP
REPORT
19
(2006),
available
at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/web_video/membership_report/2008/content/p
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contrast, members of Division I (32% of NCAA active members70)
received 69%71 of 2012–13 NCAA revenues, and members of the
Big Five conferences (6% of NCAA members) received 31% of the
Division I distributions.72 The likely intent of the legislation was
to make clear to the rest of the membership that Division I-earned
revenues would stay with Division I, and Division II and III
should not expect support beyond the payment of expenses for
their teams to participate in NCAA national championships and
the benefits of limited association wide programs, such as
providing catastrophic insurance for all NCAA athletes.
The Big Five conferences achieved further restructure of the
NCAA that gave them even greater legislative autonomy in
2014.73 They claim that with such autonomy, they will use
revenues from the College Football Playoff to enhance athletes’
welfare by providing athletic scholarships covering the full cost of
college attendance and lifelong scholarship support for former
athletes wishing to complete undergraduate degrees74—both of
which were legislative provisions previously rejected by the
NCAA.75 However, that claim is disingenuous because it gives the
impression that only Big Five conference institutions have the
financial ability to provide such benefits. For instance, the Big
Five conferences have not proposed that the NCAA, rather than
the FBS, own the College Football Playoff in the same way the
NCAA owns the Final Four basketball and all other national
championships, thereby creating the funding source to provide
such expanded scholarship support to all Division I athletes.
Instead, the Big Five seeks to enhance their existing advantage by
providing only their athletes with benefits that members of other
df/2006_NCAA_Membership_Report.pdf.
70. NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4. The
remaining funds are for association-wide programs and management
expenses not broken down by division. Id. at 4; see also Composition of
Membership, supra note 2.
71. NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4.
72. Id.
73. See Brian Bennett, NCAA board votes to allow autonomy, ESPN
(Aug. 8, 2014, 1:22 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321
551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-five-power-conferences.
74. See id. Not all college athletes are on “full” scholarships; however,
the highest percentage of athletes on full scholarships are in Division I
basketball and football. See id.
75. See id.
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FBS or Division I conferences cannot match due to more limited
financial resources. It is clear that the overriding goal of the Big
Five conferences is to keep as much revenue as they can so they
gain the greatest advantage in being able to attract prospective
student-athletes, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will
win football and basketball games. In short, these institutions
will spend as much as they can earn to achieve athletic
dominance.
III. THE THREAT OF FBS OR BIG FIVE DEPARTURE FROM THE NCAA

Given the aforementioned restructure of the NCAA to give the
FBS full license to act in its own self-interest, educators and the
public should ask why non-FBS NCAA members do not unite to
oppose such a governance imbalance, or why the membership
allowed this in the first place. The answer is that the FBS, and
now most recently, the Big Five conference institutions,
threatened to leave the NCAA if the other divisions or
subdivisions did not give them what they wanted.76
The
implication of this threat was, and is, that without these top
revenue-producing FBS institutions, Division II and III
institutions would not receive their current benefits, including
fully paid travel, hotel, and meals for those athletes and coaches
participating in NCAA championships, catastrophic injury
insurance for all student-athletes, and the benefits of other NCAA
association-wide programs. In addition, the non-FBS members of
Division I fear that a pullout by the FBS institutions would
undermine the value of the Division I Basketball Final Four,
which is their most significant revenue source.
But what would actually happen if the FBS or the Big Five
conference institutions pulled out of the NCAA? Is this really a
viable threat, or is it an empty one? It seems reasonable to

76. See Tim Tucker, Slive threatens move to ‘Division 4’ if autonomy isn’t
approved, ATLANTA J. CONST. (May 30, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://www.
ajc.com/news/sports/college/slive-threatens-move-to-division-4-if-autonomyisn/nf9xH/#__federated=1. Choosing to leave the NCAA or becoming a
member of Division IV result in the same outcome because of the regulations
implemented in 1997 that allow new subdivisions to keep their revenues.
The practical effect of leaving the NCAA and becoming Division IV would be
to undermine the NCAA Final Four basketball championship revenue
distribution and all Division I institutions.
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assume that such a departure is unlikely for three reasons. First,
given the number of collegiate institutions that would be
negatively affected by such a move, it is reasonable to assume that
those
institutions
would
pressure
their
congressional
representatives to act to stop such a possibility. In such case,
Congress could use either withdrawal of its substantial athletic
program tax preferences or institutional non-qualification for
Higher Education Act funding to dissuade such a move. Such
congressional actions would financially cripple the FBS athletic
programs and their larger institutional hosts, and the threat of
such action would probably be enough to deter their departure.
Second, the most commercialized athletic programs need the
philosophical protection of the significantly larger number of
Division II and III athletic programs that allows the NCAA to
defend itself in court against antitrust suits, positioning that their
members conduct educational sport programs in which
amateurism is a critical element. These notions of Division I
football and basketball programs being educational rather than
professional sport operations are currently being attacked by a
number of antitrust lawsuits.77 Also, a recent ruling by the
regional office of the National Labor Relations Board on the
request of Northwestern University football players to unionize
classified these players as employees.78 However, the courts have,
at least up to the date of publication of this Article, largely
supported the NCAA’s position in most cases.79 Even the recent
ruling in the O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, while
undermining the NCAA’s definition of amateurism, acknowledges
the need to keep compensation of student-athletes within the
range of federal, student financial aid maximum limits, plus
modest additional financial aid from group licensing fees.80
77. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In
re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2541, 2014 WL
2547809 (J.P.M.L. June 4, 2014) (consolidating Alston v. NCAA, No. 4:1401011 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) and Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:14-01678 (D.N.J.
June 18, 2014)).
78. Nw. Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1922054, at *22–24
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).
79. See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack
v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Hennessy v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136
(5th Cir. 1977); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
80. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
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Because they control the bulk of media rights revenues, if the FBS
or the Big Five conferences were to depart, they would find
themselves in the crosshairs of these lawsuits and unionization
efforts and, arguably, much weaker with regard to an educationalsport defense.
Third, it is unlikely that college presidents would allow their
institutions to depart from the NCAA. Most college presidents
agree that they cannot control their athletic programs.81
Presidents of institutions and athletic directors who are perceived
to be acting in ways that make their athletic teams less
competitive put their jobs in jeopardy. It only takes one powerful
donor, trustee, or legislator to raise the guillotine. It appears
reasonable to assume that college presidents would recognize that
creating an independent, national governance association
consisting of only the most commercialized athletic programs
would exacerbate current problems and result in further loss of
presidential control.
IV. IS REFORM POSSIBLE?

It is clear that the NCAA in general and Division I in
particular are incapable of major reform because of the previously
described institutionalization of FBS legislative self-interest at
both the organizational and Division I governance levels.
Depending on the FBS to navigate the return to a studentcentered focus runs counter to a history deeply devoted to
pursuing commercial, sport revenue outcomes. The current lack of
appetite for non-FBS NCAA members to rise in opposition to
recent FBS proposals for more legislative autonomy and power
appears to reflect an environment of resignation. NCAA members
will most likely go along with continued FBS efforts to solidify a
plutocracy.82 Thus, it is unrealistic to imagine that this wealthy,

81. See KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH FOOTBALL BOWL SUBDIVISION
UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS ON THE COSTS AND FINANCING OF INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS, REPORT OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS § 3(A), at 7 (2009)
[hereinafter KNIGHT COMM.].
82. See Bob Kustra, NCAA Reforms a Subterfuge for Fueling the Arms
Race in Intercollegiate Athletic Spending, CBS SPORTS, http://www.
cbssports.com/images/collegefootball/Bob-Kustra-Boise-State-Division-I-NCA
A-Reform.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
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ruling class will voluntarily give up power.
Therefore, in the author’s view, there are only two realistic
possibilities for changing course, one a consequence of the courts
and the National Labor Relations Board classifying college
football and basketball players as professional athletes, and the
other a proactive return to sports as bona fide, higher-education,
extracurricular activities appropriate for a non-profit, educational
enterprise. The former possibility is that the NCAA Division I
financial model of not paying athletes gets blown up by the
current spate of antitrust suits still outstanding. If the athletes
who are currently involved in the litigation win, Division I
institutions would face a tsunami-like financial catastrophe. The
current system is based on non-taxable student scholarships,
rather than payment to employees. A collegiate-professional sport
model based on paying student-athletes as employees in an open
marketplace would put the current institutional funding model at
incredible risk.
The current financial system is demonstrably unstable. As
previously stated, in 2012–13, only 20 institutions were making
more than they spent.83 In 2012–13, at least 70 of the 121 FBS
head football coaches and 35 of the 68 head basketball coaches
whose teams qualified for the 2014 Final Four were under long
term contracts making a $1 million or more in annual salaries.84
These salaries are possible only because of a rigged marketplace,
which is characterized by a low-pay labor force of athletes (limited
scholarship awards rather than an open marketplace), budgets
that are bolstered by non-profit, educational institution general
funds, student fee subsidies, and inflated revenues due to tax
benefits available to donors. Further, expenses continue to rise
faster than revenues,85 and the entire system is operating below
normal professional sport business costs because non-profit
organizations are exempt from taxes. Other than the prediction of
an inevitable crash, no one knows exactly what would happen if
institutions were suddenly faced with any of the following
83.
84.

D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
See Steve Berkowitz et al., 2014 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, USA
TODAY, www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
However, no salary information was provided for private institutions. See id.
85. See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, http://
www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
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realities: (1) paying basketball and football player salaries; (2)
paying unemployment insurance and workers compensation; (3)
loss of tax preferences for donors contributing to the athletic
department or purchasing tickets tied to seating preferences; or
(4) NCAA determination of athlete scholarship limits and benefits
being replaced with collective bargaining with athlete unions.
The second alternative, and one that would surely be ignited
if a financial crash were to occur, is congressional intervention.
Congress could condition receipt of billions of dollars of student
financial aid and other federal funds distributed via the Higher
Education Act of 196586 on the reform of the NCAA’s highly
commercialized athletic programs. Congress could also establish a
federally chartered non-profit organization, similar to the United
States Olympic Committee, to replace the NCAA, and require that
all higher-education institutions with commercialized, athletic
programs be members or risk losing Higher Education Act funding
for noncompliance. Congress, in effect, could force a resetting of
the educational sport moral compass much like Title IX did for
women in sports.87 Such congressional action would likely target
institutions with athletic programs that generate more than $1
million in annual revenues and require these programs to afford
specific protections and benefits to student-athletes. Granted, the
prospect of congressional action given the current dysfunction of
that entity would be extraordinary. However, historically, there
has been government action when the wellbeing of so many young
athletes is at stake. Indeed, the origination of the NCAA in 1906
was due in part to government pressure to stop football-related
deaths.88 The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act in
1978, which established the United States Olympic Committee as
a federally chartered non-profit organization, addressed the
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1058 (2012) (defining eligibility to receive funds under
the Act).
87. Title IX conditions receipt of federal funds on conducting educational
programs or activities that do not discriminate on the basis of sex. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (2012). This law, which was adopted in 1972, effectively negated close
to a century of discrimination against women in scholastic and college
athletic programs. See generally Cassandra Jones, Book Review, 22 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 613 (2012) (reviewing DEBORAH BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME:
TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS REVOLUTION (2010)).
88. See Bob Green, The president who saved football, CNN (Feb. 5, 2012,
8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/05/opinion /greene-super-bowl/.
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dysfunction of the Amateur Athletic Union and its lack of due
process and fair treatment for amateur athletes representing the
United States on our national teams.89 In fact, government
threats to amend the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports
Act to reorganize the Board of Directors forced the United States
Olympic Committee to eliminate its large Board of Directors,
which at the time consisted of self-interested organizational
members, and replaced it with a Board consisting primarily of
independent directors.90
Congressional action appears to be the only reasonable
alternative, not only for the aforementioned reasons, but also for a
number of additional reasons:
1. Research by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate
Athletics has demonstrated that 80% of college FBS
presidents believe they are unable to control the excesses
of FBS commercialized sports.91
2. The NCAA’s historical record of not having demonstrated
the ability to initiate significant reforms, especially those
that control commercial excesses and address the
educational exploitation of academically underprepared
athletes.
3. The challenges of reform are so complex, including,
significantly, requiring FBS institutions to remain a part
of the larger NCAA community (which could be a
requirement of congressional action), such that it is
reasonable to believe that only the threat of loss of federal,
Higher Education funding will move the needle toward
meaningful change; and
4. Only Congress has the power to grant a limited antitrust
exemption to stop the financial bleeding from antitrust
lawsuits, and only Congress can give subpoena authority
to help fix a broken NCAA enforcement system that must
afford better due process to its members. Moreover, it is

89. See 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (2012).
90. See Reform of the United States Olympic Committee: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. 8–10 (2003)
(statement of Donald Fehr, Co-Chairman, Indep. Comm. on Reform, U.S.
Olympic Comm.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108sh
rg87340/pdf/CHRG-108shrg87340.pdf.
91. KNIGHT COMM., supra note 81, at 25.
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reasonable to believe that Congress will not grant an
antitrust exemption or subpoena power without the
assurance of immediate, meaningful, and sustainable
reform.
V. WHAT WOULD MEANINGFUL REFORM LOOK LIKE?

The author and others,92 believe that the minimum provisions
of such a congressional bill should address the need for:
 A limited antitrust exemption for the governance
organization (either the NCAA or a replacement, federally
chartered, non-profit organization) that permits the
national governance organization to control sport
operating costs, including coaches’ salaries and other
commercial elements, but conditioned on compliance with
all reform provisions;
 Exclusive ownership of national championships by the
national governance organization (which would preclude
the current FBS conference ownership of the College
Football Playoffs) in order to generate revenues to be
distributed to member institutions so they could provide
academic, health, and welfare benefits to the greatest
number of athletes, rather than a select few (i.e., FBS and
particularly the Big Five conferences);
 More stringent due process protections for member
institutions and binding arbitration for student-athletes
faced with significant loss of privileges or benefits,
including giving subpoena power and the power to require
statements under oath to professional judges hired as third
party contractors to oversee the adjudication of alleged
serious rule violations;
 An independent board of directors responsible for
legislating educational sport conditions for the good of all
athletes, rather than the commercial interests of a limited
92. In 2013–14, a subcommittee of The Drake Group, of which the
author was a member, developed such a model congressional action. See
Collegiate Athletic Association of the United States (Aug. 8, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Roger Williams Univ. Law Review).
Other members of the subcommittee were Brian Porto, Gerald Gurney, Allen
Sack, and Andrew Zimbalist. The remainder of the paper describes the
congressionally mandated minimum reforms suggested by that group.
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number of the wealthiest athletic programs (e.g., removal
of the current commercial athletic program self-interest
legislative system);
Institutional, conference, and national governance
organization media revenue set-asides to establish an
academic trust fund dedicated to the provision of long-term
health and educational benefits to injured athletes and the
provision of educational assistance to those unable to
complete their degrees;
Freshman ineligibility and mandatory remedial programs
for specially admitted or other athletes whose high school
GPA or SAT scores are below one standard deviation from
the mean academic profile of their entering classes;
Caps on sport operating costs, salaries, and wages;
Tenured faculty oversight of athlete academic achievement
and academic counseling and support practices, including
academic authorities, rather than athletic departments
controlling tutoring, advising, and other academic support
programs;
Whistle-blower protection for those who report rule
infractions;
Scholarship awards that are guaranteed for five years or
until graduation and cannot be gradated or terminated
based on injury, athletic performance, or disciplinary
measures not applicable to non-athlete students;
Specified athlete rights related to medical care, baseline
neurological testing, preventive health education for lifethreatening conditions, catastrophic injury insurance
coverage provided by the institution/athletic governance
organization at no cost to the athlete or athlete’s parents,
transfer to other institutions without the current athletics
eligibility penalty, respectful and professional treatment
by coaches, and licensed physician determination of return
to play following injuries;
Prohibition of construction of athlete-only facilities;
Post-season ineligibility for institutions not in compliance
with Title IX; and
Annual reports to Congress open to the general public.

These mandates deserve additional explanation.
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A. Limited Antitrust Exemption
As collegiate athletic event media rights revenues rise into
the stratosphere and the prospect of treble damages under
antitrust law appeals to contingency lawyers, a national
governance organization limited antitrust exemption appears to
be a necessity. Without it, any national governance organization
will be unable to fulfill a primary function: control of interstate
collegiate athletics commerce in order to limit spending on
athletics. Any spending limits related to commercial activity (e.g.,
sport operating, or salaries and wages caps, or not permitting
contests on weekdays) will be challenged.
Before 1984, the NCAA controlled the number of football
games that could appear on television during the season.93
Generally, an NCAA “game of the week” was televised nationally,
and several games were televised regionally.94 In the early 1980s,
major football powers began to complain because of viewer
demand for their games, arguing that they should be able to sell
their television rights to the highest bidder without interference
from the NCAA.95 This led to an antitrust lawsuit against the
NCAA.96 In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the major
football powers, holding that the NCAA was acting like a classic
cartel—producers who gather together to control sale, price, or
production of any product in order to restrain competition.97 In
the decades following this landmark ruling the number of football
games on television grew dramatically. Games are now played on
just about any night of the week with little regard for the impact
on athletes’ educations or the thousands of non-athlete students
skipping classes to attend such contests. College football and
basketball began to radically alter schedules to meet the needs of
the networks. Universities now jump from one conference to
another in hopes that such realignment will allow them to
penetrate new markets.98 Athletes who are now playing during
93. See Andrew Zimbalist, Inequality in Intercollegiate Athletics:
Origins, Trends and Policies, 6 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 5, 6–8 (2013).
94. See id. at 6.
95. See id. at 7.
96. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
97. Id. at 95–96, 120.
98. See Ivan Maisel, Conference peace has arrived, ESPN (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10452933/college-football-realign
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the week have the added burden of long trips to play games across
the country because of these conference realignments. Only a
limited antitrust exemption can allow the national governance
organization to address such scheduling problems without fear of
being sued. Faculty senates also need to address this scheduling
issue. What started as a football problem has become a problem
for all college sports at just about every level.
The significant legal cost of responding to such lawsuits and
the multimillion-dollar cost of settling or losing these lawsuits will
undermine the legislative and financial stability of intercollegiate
athletics if such a limited exemption is not forthcoming. Such an
antitrust exemption can be narrowly crafted to focus on specific
categories of rules in order to avoid the legal morass of any broad
“educational purpose” standard that would require court
interpretation. Further, the granting of such a limited exemption
would be conditioned on the adoption and continued enforcement
of a full slate of reform mandates.
B. National Governance Organization Ownership of National
Championships
Any bill must mandate that the national governance
organization will own all national championship competitions, and
the proceeds from such events are to be used to advance the
health and academic welfare of all student-athletes and all
member institutions. In other words, ownership of national
championships by the national governance organization must
include the College Football Playoffs, which is currently owned by
the FBS conferences. The media and other revenues from any
national football championship should be used like that of the
Division I Basketball Final Four revenues, with the bulk of those
revenues designated for specified athlete benefit purposes and a
portion used to benefit all NCAA student-athletes, like, for
example, the NCAA’s catastrophic injury insurance program.99
The current 4-team FBS playoff, which will yield at least $440
million annually beginning in 2014–15,100 could and should be
ment-era-ended.
99. See NCAA CATASTROPHIC INSURANCE PROGRAM BENEFIT SUMMARY,
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/14-16%20Cat%20Benefit%20Summary
.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
100. See Schroeder, supra note 58.
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used for:
 The provision of basic injury insurance coverage for all
450,000 NCAA athletes, rather than the current practice of
using student and parent policies, at an estimated annual
cost of $230 to 260 million;
 Regular review and enhancements to the current
catastrophic injury policy, an estimated $15 to 20 million
in annual cost;
 Subsidies to all Division I institutions that would allow
them to afford higher cost of attendance athletic
scholarship limits (using the same federal standards used
for all students), which would benefit all scholarship
athletes at every Division I institution instead of just the
65 Big Five conference members, at an estimated $150 to
$170 million annual cost; and
 Hiring and using judges and investigators to preside over
severe and significant breach of rules cases and other
NCAA enforcement system due process improvements,
such as binding arbitration for college athlete appeals, at
an annual cost of $5 to $6 million.101
This distribution of revenue is focused on benefitting athletes and
is very different from the current system, under which the Big
Five conferences are allowed to keep 75% of these proceeds to fuel
astronomical coaches’ salaries and lavish facility excesses of the
football and basketball arms race. It should be noted that the
FBS institutions retain 100% of all of their non-national
championship post-season bowl events, conference championships,
and regular season football television media rights fees.102 FBS
institutions could continue to retain all of these non-national
championship event revenues, which could be specifically
protected as institutional property rights under the provisions of
such a bill.

101. These estimates were developed as part of a working paper by The
Drake Group. See Answers to the Most Commonly Asked Questions About
the Collegiate Athletic Association of the United States Act app. C, at 46–47
(Sep. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Roger Williams Univ.
Law Review).
102. See Schroeder, supra note 58.
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C. Due Process Protections
The bill could specify more stringent due process
requirements before suspending a coach, athlete, or other athletics
personnel from participating in athletics events; suspending the
institution’s athletics events telecommunications privileges; or
suspending a member institution from participating in a collegiate
athletics event. In severe cases, these processes might include:






pre-hearing discovery;
confrontation and cross-examination of opposing witnesses;
subpoena and statements under oath by third party
witnesses;
binding arbitration of athlete eligibility issues; and
provision of an athlete welfare advocate to provide legal
assistance to athletes facing such penalties.

The current perceptions of enforcement processes favoring the
largest athletic programs or conflict of interest in adjudication by
peer member institutions could be removed by the required use of
judges and third party investigators. Subpoena and statements
under oath by third party witnesses, powers that could be granted
by Congress, would solve the uncooperative witness issue now
plaguing an ineffective NCAA enforcement system.
D. Independent Board of Directors
Adoption of a fiduciary responsible for the membership as a
whole and advancing educational sport conditions for the good of
all athletes, rather than representing the narrow interests of a
wealthy few, is only possible if members of the Board of Directors
are not employed or currently serving member institutions and
not charged with representing a membership subset. Members
could be nominated based on their expertise, past experience in
athletics, and integrity.
E. Academic Trust Fund
The bill could also include a mandate that 5% or some
designated amount of all media revenues derived from
institutional, conference, and national governance organization
athletic events be set aside to fund an Academic Trust Fund—
providing assistance with degree completion, graduate program,
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or other educational benefits to student-athletes. An Academic
Trust Fund is a sensible way to provide benefits beyond athletic
scholarships and a sound alternative to paying players to
participate in athletics. Former athletes could apply for and
justify requests for funding, rather than institutions making a
blanket promise that sends the message: Don’t worry about
studying now. Focus on athletics, and we’ll make sure you can
complete your degree later.
F. Freshman Ineligibility
Underprepared Athletes

and

Required

Remediation

of

Particularly in Division I, but in other competitive divisions
as well, coaches knowingly recruit high-academic-risk athletes
into highly competitive academic environments. When they do so,
huge pressures are created for underprepared students to be
steered into the easiest majors and courses. Further, a college
athlete recruited into such a situation faces an uphill battle to
maintain self-esteem and remain academically eligible.
If an incoming recruit falls one standard deviation below the
high school grade point average or standardized test scores of an
institution’s incoming class, this is a good predictor of future
academic difficulty or ineligibility. Athletes in such challenging
situations should become established academically before being
allowed to participate in athletics, and institutions should be
required to provide academic support programs to assist them in
overcoming identified academic deficiencies during that pivotal
first year. Retention studies on both athletes and students who
are not athletes repeatedly demonstrate the importance of the
first year of college.103 Further, the at-risk athlete should not be
under the same time demands as an athlete who is eligible to
participate. Thus, a requirement limiting athletic participation to
10-hours per-week of athletics practice is justifiable. The at-risk
athlete would not be “penalized” for this forced academic redshirt
year in that he or she would be eligible for athletics financial aid
and limited practice and will still have four years of athletics
eligibility and financial aid remaining. The one-year of residency
in such circumstances is an investment in the athlete’s future
103. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE BOTTOM LINE: OBSERVATION
ARGUMENTS ON THE SPORT BUSINESS 233–34 (2006).

AND
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academic success. The issue is not whether academically at-risk
athletes are admitted. The issue is one of exploitation. If the
institution provides remediation and fulfills the promise of a
college education, there can be no allegation of exploitation. If the
institution knowingly admits an underprepared student and fails
to remediate and provide a college education, allowing that
student to play a sport whose success benefits the institution, it
can be justifiably said that he or she is being exploited.
The standard-deviation methodology is tied to the academic
profile of each NCAA member institution. Thus, an athlete with
poor high school academic performance or low standardized test
grades may be immediately eligible if he or she matches up (is
within one standard deviation) with an institution’s general
student body profile. Such an approach would reinforce sound
admissions practices by promoting consideration of the athlete’s
academic fit. Recruited athletes may opt for institutions that offer
a better fit and increased chances of academic success.
G. Caps on Athletic Program Expenditures
Current NCAA membership division criteria focuses primarily
on minimum conditions and sets no expenditure ceilings except for
athlete scholarships, inviting an unlimited expenditure “arms
race.” Athletic program operating expenses can be capped, and
such caps can accommodate flexibility regarding team travel.
Costs can be further limited with more stringent limits on the
number of contests and length of playing seasons. Salaries and
wages of coaches and administrative personnel could be capped
commensurate with non-profit, educational marketplace practices.
For instance, there could be a rule limiting coach compensation to
no more than two or three times the 95th percentile salaries of full
professors at doctoral institutions.
Coupled with stringent
definitions limiting the numbers of head and assistant coaches
and other support personnel, the practice of highly excessive
salaries could be brought under control. Something is very wrong
with the system when in 40 of the 50 states, the highest paid
public employee is a head athletics coach.104
104. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest Paid
Employee a Coach? (Probably), DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://dead
spin.com/infographic-is-your-states-highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228.
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It should be noted that current compensation for coaches and
athletic directors is the result of a rigged marketplace. Coaches
reap extraordinary salaries because there is no paid labor force—
no athlete employees—yet, they maintain that they should be
treated as if they operate in the professional, sports marketplace.
They actually operate in a non-profit, educational environment in
which salaries are lower than in the for-profit world.
Further, the number of professional sports teams is limited;
therefore, competition for coaches is also limited.
Higher
education has created an artificial environment that has no
comparator in the commercial marketplace. Andrew Zimbalist,
noted sport economist, has criticized this manufactured “economic
rent”—the portion of a coach’s salary in excess of what is needed
to keep a coach employed in a rigged market:
Consider
the
multimillion-dollar
compensation
packages offered to dozens of college football and
basketball coaches. There are thirty-two NFL and thirty
NBA head coaching jobs. These jobs are already taken.
What would be the most remunerative alternative
employment [for these college coaches if they did not
coach at these universities] . . . for argument’s sake,
suppose there was an NCAA rule stipulating that no head
coach could be paid more than the university president at
the school. Would [these coaches] find another job that
paid them more than $500,000? Probably not.
. . . I don’t begrudge people seeking whatever the market
will pay them. But given that (1) the market for college
coaches is rigged by tax exemptions, subsidies, etc.; (2)
paying the coach more than the school president sends
the wrong message about a university’s priorities; (3) the
star athletes on the basketball and football teams are not
allowed to receive cash salaries; and (4) resource
allocation would not be affected by a salary-limit rule for
coaches, it would make eminent sense for the NCAA to
pass such a rule limiting head coach compensation.
The solution seems straightforward, but there are two
significant impediments. First, its elevated rhetoric
notwithstanding, the NCAA basically functions as a trade
association of athletics directors and coaches. Why would

LOPIANOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2015 11:09 AM

280 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:250
they vote to reduce their own compensation?
Second, such a rule would require Congress to pass an
antitrust exemption for this market restriction. I can
think of no good reason why Congress would not
cooperate on this, if asked by the NCAA. There’s the
Catch 22.105
When former private business workers choose to become
higher education faculty or private attorneys choose to work as
public defenders (another non-profit environment), they willingly
accept compensation a commensurate with that of public servants.
Many expert faculty members can make much more as full-time
consultants, and many public defenders can make much more in
private practice. Coaches can also do so if they can access the
small number of high paying jobs that are available each year in
professional football and basketball. This is always an option for
coaches. But choosing to work in higher education should mean
foregoing professional coaching salaries.
H. Tenured Faculty Oversight of Academic Matters
One of the National Labor Relations Board criteria for
determining whether Northwestern University football players
were paid employees was supervision by academic faculty.106
Establishing a tenured faculty athletics oversight committee
elected by the institution’s highest faculty governing body would
resolve this concern.
In higher education, the faculty is ultimately responsible for
the academic integrity of the institution. The national athletic
governance organization should have a requirement for such
oversight.
The NCAA does not currently have such a
requirement. If an institution voluntarily has an athletics council
or committee, though, the NCAA requires that a majority of its
members be administrators or faculty members.107 Yet, such
committees do not have responsibilities that specify the
mechanisms of oversight or accountability, and faculty
105. ZIMBALIST, supra note 103, at 282.
106. Nw. Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1922054, at *19 (N.L.R.B.
Mar. 26, 2014).
107. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 6.1.2.1, at 41.
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appointments are usually made by the president with the
approval of the athletic director in order to ensure that strong
athletic supporters occupy these positions.108 Requiring a higher
education institution to have a tenured faculty-only committee
elected by the highest faculty governance entity at the institution,
mandating that such a committee produce an annual report from
that committee to the institution’s faculty senate, and assigning
this group specific committee oversight activities would reduce the
possibility of academic fraud by athletic programs. This oversight
committee should be charged with tasks like regularly examining
the academic progress and qualifications of athletes, comparing
average SAT and ACT scores and Federal Graduation Rates by
sport with average scores for the student body, reporting
graduation success rates, examining athlete registration in
independent studies and their average grade assigned, compiling
admissions profiles of athletes compared to the student body,
tracking athletes’ progress toward a degree, and examining trends
in selected majors by sport. This data represents areas in which
athletic programs have experienced integrity violations in the
past.109 This oversight mechanism would guarantee the level of
transparency necessary to identify integrity concerns.
I.

Whistle-blower Protection

It has been an embarrassment to higher education to watch
the “shooting of the messenger” in cases of clear academic fraud.
For example, the University of North Carolina’s (“UNC”) tutoring
improprieties, failure to report student-athlete plagiarism, and
bogus classes (20% of all students enrolled in independent studies
at UNC were athletes) were well documented.110 The learning
specialist in the athletic department’s academic support program
who reported the violations was dismissed from that position.111
Yet, the NCAA has no rule that prohibits retaliation against those
108. See id. (providing for only a majority by generally-defined
administrators and requiring an administrator or faculty as chair).
109. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, In Fake Classes Scandal, UNC Fails Its
Athletes—and Whistle-Blower, BLOOMSBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-02-27/in-fake-classes-scandal-unc
-fails-its-athletes-whistle-blower.
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., id.
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who report rule violations or unethical conduct. Reform attempts
should address this vacancy by providing some level of protection
for individuals who report infractions.
J.

Athletic Scholarship Guarantees

Multiyear scholarships that cannot be gradated or canceled on
the basis of athletic ability, performance, or contribution to team
success clearly indicate that the athlete is not being paid for his or
her athletic performance. Rather the athlete, in recognition of
extraordinary athletic skill, is being awarded a college education.
The relationship between coaches and athletes would no longer be
perceived as a contractual quid pro quo, thus helping the national
governance organization retain a clear line of demarcation
between collegiate and professional sports. Universities would
signal that players they recruit are valued as students first,
regardless of performance on the athletic field. Because coaches
would have to work with their “recruiting mistakes,” these
athletes would have a chance to mature into players who can
contribute to team success and, perhaps, get significant playing
time. Besides raising graduation rates, these scholarships would
allow athletes to become an integral part of the student body and
benefit from the human capital often associated with a prestigious
university. No court in the country would mistake a college
athlete on scholarship for a university employee, thus significantly
cutting the time and money the national association spends on
antitrust lawsuits or challenging adverse decisions by the
National Labor Relations Board.
K. Athlete Rights
The power imbalance between young athletes and their
coaches and athletic administrators is significant. Thus, it is
critical that the national governance organization Board of
Directors be specifically charged with promulgating and enforcing
regulations in the area of protecting the basic health, freedom,
and welfare rights of athletes. At a minimum, athletes should
have the right to:
1. Transfer to another institution without athletic
participation ineligibility or other penalty, at least once
during that athlete’s undergraduate enrollment and
conditioned on that athlete meeting all academic and
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athletic participation eligibility requirements at the
current institution at the time of transfer;
Receiving institutionally financed prevention education
and baseline and/or monitoring assessments for sportsrelated injuries and risks (e.g., neurological baseline
assessments related to concussion, presence of sickle cell
trait, review of susceptibility to dehydration, etc.), for those
athletes predisposed to injury risk due to the nature of
their sports participation, as recommended by the
American College of Sports Medicine, the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, or other national
associations of specialist physicians.
Receive athletic program adopted exercise and supervision
guidelines to identify potentially life-threatening health
conditions (such as in the case of sickle cell trait,
susceptibility to heat or cold related illness, or
dehydration);
Receive licensed physician determination for return-toplay following any injury or other medical decision
affecting the athlete’s safe participation;
Receive initial and continuing treatment for any injury
directly resulting from participation in his or her
institution’s athletic program at no cost to college athletes
or their parents with such requirement not applicable to
any preexisting medical condition that predates the
athlete’s participation in the institution’s athletic program;
Be treated with respect and protected from sexual or
professional relationship misconduct, physical, verbal, or
mental abuse, and other pedagogy practices that endanger
their health and welfare;
Report any alleged misconduct by a coach, athletics
personnel, or another athlete to a non-athletics
institutional employee with an assurance of “whistle
blower protection;” and
Receive stringent due process protections.

L. Prohibition of Construction of Athlete-Only Facilities
No small subset of the student body should receive the
extraordinary privilege of exclusive access to university facilities,
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whether they are paid for by athletics revenues or private
donations. It is particularly irresponsible in the current economic
climate to engage in such practices. Numerous institutions use
public bonds to finance such athletic department projects.112
Despite the fact that NCAA rules have long prohibited exclusive
housing units for athletes,113 no rules prohibit the construction of
facilities used only by athletes, which has led to extravagances
such as:
 The (Oregon) Ducks’ Football Performance Center is a
145,000 square-foot building that cost a reported $68
million.114 Amenities include a lobby with 64 55-inch
televisions that can combine to show one image, a weight
room floor made of Brazilian hardwood, custom foosball
tables where one team is Oregon and the other team has
11 players each representing the rest of the Pac-12, a
barber shop, and a coaches’ locker room with TVs
embedded in the mirrors.115 Athletes already had access
to an indoor practice field, an athletic medical center, a
brand-new basketball arena, and an academic study center
for athletes.116 Oregon’s new football program complex
contains, among other things, movie theaters, an Oregon
football museum, a players’ lounge and deck, a dining hall,
and private classrooms for top players.117
 Athletic-only practice facilities at West Virginia
University, utilized only by the Mountaineer men’s and
women’s programs, allows Mountaineer basketball players
112. See Kristi Dosh, Multiple ways to finance college stadiums, ESPN
(June 14, 2014, 11:08 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/
id/743/multiple-ways-to-finance-college-stadiums.
113. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 16.5.1, at 214.
114. See Tony Manfred, Oregon’s New $68 Million Football Facility is like
Nothing We’ve Ever Seen in College Sports, BUS. INSIDER (July 31, 2013, 10:41
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/new-oregon-football-building-photos2013-7.
115. See id; see also Dan Greenspan, Oregon unveils eye-popping new
Football Performance Center, NFL (Jul. 31, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.
nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000224020/article/oregon-unveils-eyepopping-new
-football-performance-center (last modified Aug. 2, 2013, 2:52 PM).
116. See Steven Davis, University of Oregon Athletics Unveils Latest
Technology in Facility Makeover, SPORT TECHIE (July 26, 2012),
http://www.sporttechie.com/2012/07/26/university-of-oregon-170/.
117. See id.; see also Casanova Center, GO DUCKS, http://www.goducks.
com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=205174793 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
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to have access to the best performance training tools
available, top tier practice areas, strength and conditioning
space, sports medicine needs, team meeting and video
rooms, and facility equipment.118 Adding all the elements
of performance training and providing first class locker
room facilities, player’s lounges, and study areas, the
basketball practice facility provides a distinct advantage in
recruiting top tier student-athletes and showcasing the
best Mountaineer Basketball and WVU can offer.119
The Texas A&M University football players’ lounge and
academic center is 5,000-square feet and conveniently
located one floor above the locker room, training room, and
meeting rooms, and is across the hall from the new stateof-the-art, athletic-only academic center.120 It is outfitted
with ample leather seating, tables, and oversized leather
lounge chairs that recline to a full prone position so players
can watch the huge widescreen high-definition
television.121 Other activities include ping-pong, foosball,
pool, and gaming tables, as well as several arcade-style
gaming stations that feature the latest video game
systems.122 Several flat-screen TVs are mounted in each
corner of the room.123 Immediately to the left of the
lounge’s entrance is a marble-top bar that contains soft
drink and candy machines for the players’ use.124

Academic support facilities for athletes are often of higher
quality than those available to the student body. Weight training
facilities are often larger and include higher quality equipment
than what are available to the student body. Gymnasia or fields
that are used only for basketball or team practices and left unused
for the majority of the day should be unacceptable, especially in
the current stressful economic environment for higher education.
118. See Basketball Practice Facility, W. VA. MOUNTAINEERS,
http://www.wvusports.com/page.cfm?section=18089 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
119. See id.
120. See Bright Football Complex, TEXAS A&M, http://www.12thman.com/
ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209603262 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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Such issues are not only a matter of excessive expense, but also a
matter of impropriety as a relatively small percentage of the
overall student body participates in athletics.
Further, facilities and practices should not isolate athletes
from the rest of the student body. Athletes can be provided with
nutrition education and, if necessary, even be provided with
unlimited meal cards at student dining facilities. They do not
need or benefit from a separate eating facility, game rooms, or
lounges.
VI. INELIGIBILITY FOR POST-SEASON PLAY IF NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH
TITLE IX

Over forty years have passed since the adoption of Title IX,
yet many collegiate athletic programs are still not in compliance
with this federal law.125 Lack of Title IX compliance and data
revealing backsliding in participation and other benefits is
disturbing. A recent NCAA report revealed:
 Intercollegiate athletic participation levels are at all-time
highs, but these participation rates are increasing faster
for men than for women at both high schools and
colleges.126 Since 2001–02, men have gained 5,526 more
intercollegiate opportunities than women.127
 Division I has the best participation rate for women, but at
54% male student-athletes and 46% female studentathletes, D-I is still 7% away from mirroring the
undergraduate female population.128 D-II has a 17%
difference between female athletes and undergraduates,
while D-III has a 14% gap.129
 In 2010–11, women had a net gain of 113 intercollegiate
teams, and men experienced a net gain of 112 teams.130
But more women’s teams (69) than men’s (59) were
125. See NATIONAL COALITION FOR GIRLS & WOMEN IN EDUCATION, TITLE
IX: WORKING TO ENSURE GENDER EQUITY IN EDUCATION 7–8 (2012), available
at http://www.ncwge.org/ PDF/TitleIXat40.pdf.
126. AMY WILSON, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
AS
TITLE IX TURNS 40 6 (2012), available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/DownloadPublication.aspx?download=TITLEIX.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 10.
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dropped, a disturbing development because women
continue to be underrepresented in intercollegiate
athletics.131
Division I has the greatest gap in expenditures between
men’s and women’s athletic programs.132 Analysis of
median expenses indicates that FBS institutions are
spending 2.5 times more on their men’s programs than on
their women’s programs.133
Spending on men’s sports still exceeds that of women’s
sports by a considerable amount: a 20% difference in
median expenses at D-I, 14% in D-II, and 16% in D-III.134
From 2006 to 2010, all Divisions showed a greater increase
in spending on men’s athletic programs than women’s,
most noticeably at FBS universities where expenditures
increased by over $5 million for men and by just under $2
million for women.135
2010 NCAA figures indicate that D-I spends more on each
male student-athlete than each female student-athlete:
over $30,000 more at FBS; $3,000 more at FCS; and $1,000
more at D-I institutions without football.136 In contrast,
the most recent available data for D-II and D-III schools
show slightly higher expenditures for each female studentathlete, a result affected by the male advantage in
participation opportunities.137
Since Title IX was passed, the number of female head
coaches and female athletics directors (“AD”) has steadily
declined.138 Over the past decade, the percentage of
female coaches of women’s teams has leveled off at around
40, and since 1980, the percentage of female ADs has
remained around 20.139
Women hold only around 20% of all NCAA head coaching,

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 12–14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17, 19.
Id.
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AD, and conference commissioner positions.140
 In 2010–11, women occupied 34% of Associate AD and
Assistant AD positions, and more men (51%) than women
(49%) were assistant coaches for women’s teams.141
 Men are now coaching female student-athletes in great
numbers, but women have experienced meager increases
in opportunities to coach men.142 The most recent figures
indicate that only 4% of head coaches for men’s teams are
women.143
The federal penalty for non-compliance with Title IX is
removal of all federal funds from the institution,144 but this
penalty has never been levied because it is simply too onerous.
Instead, the Office of Civil Rights has negotiated resolution
agreements in response to complaints.145 Unfortunately, the
Office of Civil Rights does not have the resources to oversee
athletics compliance at 4,500 institutions of higher education146
and over 26,000 high schools.147 The national athletic governance
organization, however, has the power to enforce its own rules. It
140. Id. at 26.
141. Id. 18, 21, 23.
142. Id. at 17.
143. Id.
144. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
145. See Office of Civil Rights, Title IX: Sexual Harassment: Tufts
University (01-10-2089), U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/01102089.html (last modified July 25,
2014); Office of Civil Rights, Title IX: Interscholastic Athletics: Wake County
Public School System (NC) (11-11-1040); Houston Independent School District
(TX) (06-11-1061); see also Columbus City Schools (OH) (15-11-1036); Deer
Valley
Unified
School
District
(AZ)
(08-11-1030),
K.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/doc s/investigations/20120701.html
(last modified Oct. 5, 2012); Office of Civil Rights, Title IX: Sexual
Harassment: Yale University (CT): (01-11-2027), U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs /investigations/01112027.html
(last modified Nov. 19, 2012). The Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) undertook
each of these investigations in response to Title IX violations. In each case,
either during or at the conclusion of the OCR’s investigation, a resolution
agreement was reached requiring the offending institution to implement
measures to correct its violations.
146. See FAST FACTS: Educational Institutions, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=84 (last visited Jan. 3,
2015).
147. See High School Facts at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/hs/hsfacts.html (last modified
June 18, 2014).
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is reasonable to condition membership in the national athletic
governance organization and eligibility for post-season
championships on compliance with federal gender equity
requirements, just as an athletic association may require a
minimum annual progress rate for post-season eligibility.148 This
post-season eligibility gender equity stance is particularly
appropriate when a national athletic governance organization,
such as the NCAA, has adopted gender equity as a “guiding
principle.”149 Attaching eligibility for post-season championships
to the national association commitment to gender equity is
stronger than merely voicing words.
Just as the NCAA requires review of rule compliance once
every four years by entities outside the institution,150 with
athletic conferences often performing this service, it is reasonable
to assume that a similar mechanism can be used for Title IX. As
an illustration, high schools in Kentucky have been subject to such
a provision, namely, post-season ineligibility and compliance
review by the state high school athletic association, since 2001.151
Further, it is appropriate for Congress to insist on compliance
with federal laws as a condition of granting a limited antitrust
exemption and continued tax preferences.
A. Annual Reports to Congress and the Public
The strongest impetus for accountability in the conduct of
athletic programs is transparency. Congress could require that an
annual report be transmitted simultaneously to the President, to
148. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 18.4.2.2.2, at 309.
149. Id. arts. 2.3.1–.3, at 3 (“2.3 The Principle of Gender Equity. [*] 2.3.1
Compliance with Federal and State Legislation. [*] It is the responsibility of
each member institution to comply with federal and state laws regarding
gender equity. (Adopted: 1/11/94). 2.3.2 NCAA Legislation. [*] The
Association should not adopt legislation that would prevent member
institutions from complying with applicable gender-equity laws, and should
adopt legislation to enhance member institutions’ compliance with applicable
gender-equity laws. (Adopted: 1/11/94). 2.3.3 Gender Bias. [*] The activities
of the Association should be conducted in a manner free of gender bias.
(Adopted: 1/11/94)”); D-II MANUAL, supra note 29, arts. 2.3.1–.3, at 4 (same);
D-III MANUAL, supra note 35, arts. 2.3.1–.3, at 4 (same).
150. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 22.2.1.2, at 380.
151. See KENTUCKY HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASS’N, HANDBOOK 115–16
(2009–10), available at www.khsaa.org/httpdocs/titleix/titleixpolicies.pdf
(outlining Kentucky’s Title IX policy).
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each House of Congress, and posted on the national athletic
governance organization’s web site. Such a report should contain
the following data:
1. Audited financial data of each member institution’s
athletic program to include:
 student fee revenues
 direct institutional support
 indirect institutional support
 direct governmental support
 net generated revenues or negative net revenue,
whichever is applicable
 net sport operating expenses
 total salaries, wages, and benefits
 percentage of operating budget devoted to coaching
and administrative salaries
 salaries, wages, and benefits paid to the top five
employees by position
 capital construction and other debt service
 the department’s total outstanding debt
 revenues from media rights fees
 academic trust fund transfers and expenditures
2. Audited academic data of each member institution’s
athletic program to include:
 federal graduation rate for all students overall, all
athletes overall, and athletes by sport
 number of recruited freshmen or transfer athletes
whose average high school GPA or SAT scores falls
more than one standard deviation below that of
his/her entering class
 institutions ineligible for national championships
due to (a) deficiencies in academic performance, (b)
non-compliance with Title IX, or (c) disciplinary or
other reasons
3. Financial data for the national association that separately
shows:
 funds expended for direct support of college athlete
benefits (e.g., college athlete assistance programs,
athletics injury insurance or medical subsidies,
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catastrophic injury insurance, Academic Trust
Fund, etc.)
aggregated amount distributed to member
institutions by purpose
amount of direct distribution of national
association funds to each member institution
VII. CONCLUSION

The evidence is clear and compelling. Members of the NCAA
have lost control of Division I sport commercialism due to changes
that were allowed in the NCAA governance structure that gave
legislative control to the institutions with the most
commercialized athletic programs. The blame for increasingly
unregulated and commercialized Division I sport is a direct result
of a small number of the most powerful and successful athletic
programs bullying a much larger NCAA membership to succumb
to their legislative wishes by using the threat of leaving the
organization.
Given the current Division I FBS controlled
structure of the NCAA, only action by Congress using the
penalties of higher education institutions’ loss of federal, Higher
Education Act funding or tax preferences and the incentive of a
limited antitrust exemption can produce sustainable reform. It is
time for Congress to act.

